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Would Global Patent Protection be too Weak 





This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the 
standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman 
and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select 
patent strengths that are weaker than is optimal from a global perspective. The paper 
introduces three new features to the analysis: trade barriers, firm heterogeneity in terms of 
productivity and political economy considerations in setting patent policies. The first two 
features (trade barriers interacting with firm heterogeneity) tend to reduce the size of cross-
border externalities in patent protection and therefore make national IPR policies closer to the 
global optimum. With firm lobbying creating profit-bias of the government, it is even possible 
that the equilibrium strength of global patent protection is greater than the globally efficient 
level. Thus, the question of under-protection or not is an empirical one. Based on calibration 
exercises, we find that there would be global under-protection of patent rights when there is 
no international policy coordination. Furthermore, requiring all countries to harmonize their 
patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country (the US) does 
not lead to global over-protection of patent rights. 
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The global intellectual property rights (IPR) protection system was given a boost by the im-
plementation of the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights), which started a gradual process of IPR harmonization in 1995. This agree-
ment eﬀectively requires the strengthening of patent protection of many countries, and forces
the world IPR protection policies towards harmonization (albeit a partial one). TRIPS is un-
precedented in its ability to coordinate international IPR protection, not least because of the
large number of countries involved (it is under the auspices of the WTO) and its ability to
enforce rulings due to the credible threat of punishment through trade sanctions. Given the
tremendous repercussions of such a coordinated increase in the strengths of IPR protection, it is
fair to ask whether TRIPS is really a solution to a global coordination problem. It is clear that
TRIPS creates distributive eﬀect among countries.1 However, the more important question is
whether global IPR protection was too weak before TRIPS. If it was, then TRIPS can poten-
tially be globally welfare-improving and therefore potentially make all countries better oﬀ.F o r
example, if less developed countries (LDCs) lose from strengthening of their IPR and developed
countries (DCs) gain from it, but the latter’s gains outweigh the former’s losses, then it can
be mutually beneﬁcial for the LDCs to accept (partial) harmonization of IPR standards with
the DCs in exchange for the DCs’ opening their markets to goods from the LDCs. However,
if global patent protection was already too strong before TRIPS, then no such synergy exists
between negotiations on trade-related IPR and other issues of global trade.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we address the question of whether global
patent protection would be too weak if individual governments were left to decide their own
level of protection in the absence of international coordination. Second, we seek to answer
the question of whether the patent policy harmonization mandated by the TRIPS oﬀers too
much global patent protection. Both questions are important for us to evaluate the welfare
consequences of TRIPS. To answer these question s ,w ed e r i v ec o n d i t i o n st h a te n t a i lg l o b a l
under-protection (or over-protection) of IPR and perform calibration exercises to check whether
these conditions are satisﬁed.
The theoretical framework of this paper is developed by building on the work of Grossman
and Lai (2004) (henceforth G-L) who develop a non-cooperative game model with free trade and
1McCalman (2001) has shown that the US was by far the largest beneﬁciary, followed by Germany and
France as distant second and third beneﬁciaries. On the other hand, the greatest loser was Canada, followed
by Brazil and UK.
1social-welfare-maximizing governments.2 It explains how a global system of patent protection
aﬀects incentives to innovate and how it creates distortions (deadweight losses). In particular,
their model provides a basic theory that (a) explains how the national levels of patent protection
is determined in a non-cooperative equilibrium, and (b) explains how the optimal global system
of patent protection would look like.
In the basic G-L model, in the absence of international coordination, countries play a Nash
game in setting the strengths of patent protection. The best response function of a coun-
try’s government is obtained by setting the strength of patent protection that equates the
marginal costs (deadweight loss due to longer duration of monopoly pricing) and marginal
beneﬁts (increased incentives of innovation) of extending protection, given the strengths of pro-
tection of other countries. Each country confers positive externalities on foreign countries as
it extends patent protection, as it increases proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms in the home market, and
increases consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced innovations. As a result, there
is under-protection of patent rights in Nash equilibrium relative to the global optimum. In fact,
the degree of under-protection in Nash equilibrium increases with the number of independent
decision-makers in the patent-setting game.
However, two factors prevents us from directly applying G-L’s (2004) basic model to answer
whether global patent protection would be too weak without international coordination. First,
as discussed in the political economy literature, governments may put extra weight on proﬁts
as opposed to consumer surplus in their objective functions due to ﬁrm lobbying. We shall call
this proﬁt-biased preferences of governments. When governments put more weight on proﬁts,
the marginal cost of patent protection decreases since deadweight loss is smaller. Therefore,
the strength of patent protection in Nash equilibrium is stronger. Second is the existence of
trade barriers and ﬁrm heterogeneity. As recent empirical trade literature documents, only
a small fraction of (more productive) ﬁrms sell to foreign markets. Moreover, the ﬁrms that
do sell overseas have to bear trade costs, which include market entry costs, transportation
costs and import tariﬀs. When only a fraction of domestic ﬁrms would enter a foreign market,
and when there are trade costs, the positive international externalities of patent protection is
diminished. Both proﬁt-bias and trade barriers tend to diminish the degree of under-protection
2We start with the working assumption that the world was in a non-cooperative equilibrium before TRIPS.
There is no doubt that some countries attempted to coordinate their IPR policies somewhat even before TRIPS,
but empirical studies have shown that even as late as 1990, market sizes and innovative capabilities signiﬁcantly
aﬀected variation in the strengths of patent protection across countries, as would be expected of a world where
each country sets its own optimal IPR standard.
2in Nash equilibrium relative to the global optimum. If these forces are strong enough, there
may even be over-protection of patent rights in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, whether or not
there is under-protection of patents in the non-cooperative equilibrium is an empirical question.
To answer this question, we extend the G-L model by introducing three new elements: trade
barriers, ﬁrm heterogeneity in productivity and political economy considerations. We also allow
for FDI/licensing to be alternative means of serving a foreign market besides exporting.
The contributions of this paper are twofold, one theoretical and one empirical. First, we
develop a model to analyze the interaction among innovation, productivity, exporting and
patenting in a uniﬁed framework. By paying a ﬁxed cost of innovation, an innovator not only
develops a new product, but also earns the right to draw the cost of production from a pre-
determined distribution. As there are ﬁxed costs in exporting to or carrying out FDI in a foreign
c o u n t r y ,t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v ei saﬁrm, the larger is the foreign market, or the stronger is IPR
protection there, the more likely is the invention being exploited in the foreign market through
exporting, FDI or licensing. For any given foreign market, the least productive domestic ﬁrms
do not sell there, the more productive ﬁrms ship their products there, and the most productive
ﬁrms set up production facilities there or license their technology to ﬁrms there. For any given
ﬁrm, a foreign market would not be served by the ﬁrm if it is too small or IPR is too weak
there; it will begin shipping the product there if the market is suﬃciently large or IPR is
suﬃciently strong there; and it will begin carrying out FDI or licensing its technology there if
the market is even larger or IPR is even stronger. International successes increase the proﬁts
of ﬁrms and induce more innovation. Thus, there is a positive connection between innovation
in one country and patent protection in another, tempered by exporting or FDI barriers. A
government is compelled to set the national strength of patent protection to maximize an
objective function which is biased toward ﬁrm proﬁts because of ﬁrm lobbying. The question
is, would global patent protection still be too weak in equilibrium, given the existence of the
frictions in the international exploitation of technology and proﬁt-bias of governments? We
derive a tractable framework to analyze this question.
The second contribution of the paper is that it uses data and parametric values estimated
elsewhere to calibrate the theoretical model so as answer two practical questions. First, we
ﬁnd that global patent protection is too weak without international coordination. This is
because, despite the existence of trade barriers, the free-rider problem becomes very serious
when there is a large number of country-players in the patent-setting game. Second, we ﬁnd
that requiring all countries to harmonize their patent strengths with the equilibrium strength
of the most protective country does not lead to global over-protection of IPR. This is because
3the distribution of innovative capability among countries is not too skewed as to overcome the
free-rider eﬀect. We therefore conclude that there is no evidence that TRIPS leads to global
over-protection of patent rights.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 augments the G-L model
by introducing trade barriers, ﬁrm heterogeneity and political consideration. Section 3 derive
equations of the non-cooperative equilibrium and those for globally eﬃcient patent regimes. In
this section we discuss the two-country case, while in Section 4 we analyze the multi-country
one. In Section 5, we calibrate the multi-country version of the model and explore empirically
the questions of (i) whether there is global under-protection of IPR in the absence of interna-
tional coordination and (ii) whether the harmonization mandated by TRIPS over-protects IPR
globally. Section 6 concludes.
2 A theory of innovation and international patenting
The theory described in this section is basically modiﬁed from Grossman and Lai (2004) by
introducing trade barriers, ﬁrm heterogeneity and proﬁt-bias of governments.
Noncooperative Patent Protection
In this section, we study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property in
a world economy with imitation and trade. For ease of exposition, we shall start with a two-
country case, though we can easily generalize it to the multi-country one. We derive the
Nash equilibria of a game in which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and
noncooperatively. The countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and
their stocks of human capital, which proxies for their diﬀerent capacities for R&D. For the sake
of convenience, we shall term the countries “North” and “South”.
Consumers in the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the represen-
tative consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function. The instantaneous utility of a





where () is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country  at time
, () is consumption of the  diﬀerentiated product by a resident of country  at time 
and () is the number of diﬀerentiated varieties previously invented in country  that remain
4economically viable at time .T h e r ea r e consumers in country .3 It does not matter for
our analysis whether consumers can borrow and lend internationally.
In country ,i tt a k e s units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous good or
to produce one unit of any variety of the diﬀerentiated product. New goods are invented
in each region according to  =  ( )=()
 
1−
 ,w h e r e is an input
whose quantity determines the innovative capability of country ,  is the labor devoted
to R&D there. We assume that the numeraire good is tradeable with negligible trade costs,
and that it is produced in positive quantities in both countries, so that  =1  and hence
 = .D e ﬁne  =( 1−−),w h e r e is the product life of a diﬀerentiated good.
We now describe the IPR regime. Let us generalize the above description to a multi-country
setting, and let there be  countries in the set N of country-players. In each country, there is
national treatment in the granting of patent rights. Assume for simplicity that all unexpired
patents are fully enforced. Under national treatment, the government of country  aﬀords the
same protection Ω to all inventors of diﬀerentiated products regardless of their national origins,
where Ω =( 1− −),a n d is the length of the patents granted by country .I n o u r
model, a patent is an exclusive right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a ﬁxed period
of time (see Maskus, 2000a, p.36). This means that, when good  is under patent protection in
country ,n oﬁrm other than the patent holder or one designated by it may legally produce the
good in country  for domestic sale or for export, nor may the good be legally imported into
country  from an unauthorized producer outside the country. We also rule out parallel imports
– unauthorized imports of good  that were produced by the patent holder or its designee, but
that were sold to a third party outside country . When parallel imports are prevented, patent
holders can practice price discrimination across national markets.
Recent empirical trade literature documents that only a small fraction of ﬁrms export.
To capture this phenomenon, we assume that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in labor productivities
(more will be said about this later). Moreover, each producer of diﬀerentiated goods is faced
with trade barriers when selling abroad. They include: a ﬁxed cost in exporting, which is
denoted by ,aﬁxed cost in setting up production facilities in a foreign country (which we
call “carrying out FDI”), which is denoted by , and a variable trade cost of the iceberg
type (which consists of transport costs and import tariﬀs), which equals a fraction  of the
production cost if a good is exported from one country to another. As a result, only a fraction
of domestic ﬁrms will export to or set up production facilities in another foreign country. In
3We remind the reader that market size is meant to capture not the population of a country, but rather the
scale of its demand for innovative products.
5this paper, we do not distinguish between FDI and licensing as they can be regarded as more or
less equivalent. We assume that when an innovator licenses his technology to a foreign ﬁrm, he
extracts all the rents from the latter. Assuming that the licensee has to bear the same ﬁxed and
variable costs of production, FDI and licensing are equivalent.4 Hereinafter, therefore, “FDI”
shall mean “FDI or licensing”. Each consumer faces a constant-elasticity demand curve, with 
being the price elasticity of demand. We further assume that the demand of a typical consumer
is  = − (where 1), and deﬁne  =( 1+)
−+1. Therefore, y is an inverse measure of
the variable trade costs. As a ﬁrst cut, we assume that each of the three parameters ,
 and  are the same across countries. It is assumed that not only is    but also
 ·  , which guarantees that ﬁrms who choose to carry out FDI in a foreign country
always have the option of exporting but choose not to do so. Thus, we have a structure as
depicted in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). For any given foreign market, a ﬁrm with high
unit cost of production will not sell to that market; a ﬁrm with a suﬃciently lower unit cost
will export to there, and a ﬁrm with a still lower unit cost will carry out FDI there. For any
given ﬁrm, a suﬃciently large foreign market or suﬃciently strong patent protection there will
induce the ﬁrm to export to that market; further increases in the market size or strength of
patent protection there will eventually induce the ﬁrm to carry out FDI in that market. See
Figure 3 for a graphical analysis. Deﬁne e () as the monopoly proﬁto faﬁrm per consumer as
a function of its unit cost . The bold curve in Figure 3 is the upper envelope of three lines: 1.
a horizontal line with vertical intercept 0, which represents the net proﬁt (normalized to zero)
when a foreign ﬁrm does not sell to country k; 2. the line e Ω −, which represents the
net proﬁtw h e naf o r e i g nﬁrm exports to country k in addition to selling domestically; 3. the
line e Ω −, which represents the proﬁtw h e naf o r e i g nﬁrm carries out FDI in country
k besides selling domestically. When the value of e Ω lies in the range marked “Domestic
Only”, the upper envelope corresponds to the proﬁt from pure domestic sales. When e Ω
lies in the range marked “Domestic plus Export”, the upper envelope corresponds to the proﬁt
from both export and domestic sales. When e Ω lies in the range marked “Domestic plus
FDI”, the upper envelope corresponds to the proﬁt from carrying out FDI and domestic sales.
Recent political economy models indicate that politicians’ desire for campaign contribution
tends to bias the objective function of a government in favor of the contributors. In our model,
4By and large, casual observation suggests that licensing is a relatively minor channel of exploiting an
invention overseas, compared with exporting and FDI. Nonetheless, we believe that in analyzing certain markets
where licensing is pervasive one should include licensing as a separate mode of entry. This will be left to future
research.
6owners of research capital are owners of ﬁrms, who denote campaign contributions to politicians.
Following the literature, we let 1+ be the weight a government puts on domestic proﬁts when
a weight of one is put on domestic consumer surplus in its objective function. The parameter
a measures the proﬁt-bias of governments. Note that this approach of assigning additional
exogenous weight to ﬁrm proﬁts as opposed to consumer welfare is similar to what is done in
Bagwell and Staiger (2002). They essentially put a weight of 1+ on ﬁrms in the government’s
objective function, which they treat as a reduced form derived from the analysis of a political-
economy equilibrium à la Grossman and Helpman (1994). Accordingly,  is also the weight a
politician puts on campaign contribution when a weight of one is put on social welfare, given
that his objective function is the weighted sum of the two terms.






¢ where  ∈ [∞]. T h i si m p l i e st h a tPr( )=( )
.D e ﬁne  as the (uncondi-
tional) mean earnings per consumer for a monopoly selling a typical brand; deﬁne  as the
(unconditional) mean surplus that a consumer derives from purchases of a good produced at a
cost of  =1and sold at the monopoly price ;a n dd e ﬁne  as the (unconditional) mean

































It can also be shown that the distribution of revenue per consumer is also Pareto, with the
same shape parameter 
−1.
Axtell (2001) found that the size (number of employees) as well as revenue distribution
of American ﬁrms followed a Pareto distribution (): Pr( )=1− (0) where
 ∈ (0∞). For the size distribution,  =1 059 while for revenue distribution,  =0 994.
In other words, the estimated  for both distributions are very close to one. Luttmer (2007)
ﬁnds that all possible size distributions of ﬁrms have a tail similar to Pareto distribution, with
analogous tail index (equivalent to Axtell’s  and our 
−1)t h a tm u s tb es l i g h t l ya b o v eo n ei n
order to ﬁt the data. Therefore, we shall assume 




 as the probability that a foreign ﬁrm can proﬁtably export to or carry
out FDI in country ; and deﬁne 

 as the probability that a foreign ﬁrm can proﬁtably
carry out FDI in country . According to our assumptions above, if a ﬁrm can proﬁtably
export to (carry out FDI in) a larger foreign market it can also proﬁtably export to (carry
out FDI in) a smaller foreign market. Therefore, the probability that a ﬁrm in a country can
proﬁt a b l ye x p o r tt o( c a r r yo u tF D Ii n )s o m ef o r e i g nm a r k e t ( s )i se q u a lt ot h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a t
it can proﬁtably export to (carry out FDI in) the largest foreign market. We further deﬁne the














 for  =1 2.( 2 )
It can be shown (in Appendix D) that in country k each consumer can only enjoy a consumer
surplus equal to 
 from consuming a foreign-developed product, due to the existence of
trade barriers in .N o t et h a t
  , as trade barriers in  not only increase the cost of
serving the country  market by foreign ﬁrms but also prevents some foreign ﬁrms from serving
the market. Likewise, a foreign ﬁr mc a no n l ye a r nap r o ﬁt per consumer (or user) equal to 

from country k market due to the existence of trade barriers.6


























for  =1 2 (3)
In general  6=  for  6= .
























 for all  6= .( 5 )
Moreover, it is shown in Appendix C that
5Note that we preclude the cases with 1,a st h i sw o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt oi n ﬁnite mean. We are most
interested in the cases when the value of  is greater than one but very close to one.
6A higher variable trade cost (lower ) leads to higher barrier, everything else being equal. Even if the
fractions of ﬁrms that can sell overseas (

)a n dc a r r yo u tF D I( 

) are the same, a fatter tail in the
distribution of ﬁrm productivity ( 
−1 closer to one) leads to lower barrier, as the ﬁrms that do export have a
higher average productivity.






















 for all  6= .( 7 )
Note that 1−0. (5) and (7) therefore say that a country with stronger patent protection
or a larger market tends to allow a higher fraction of foreign ﬁr m st os e l lt ot h ec o u n t r ya sw e l l
as a higher fraction of foreign ﬁrms to set up production facilities there. (4) and (6) say that
given the strengths of patent protection of a country, a larger ﬁxed cost of exporting to (carrying
out FDI in) that country lowers the fraction of foreign ﬁrms that can sell to (carrying out FDI
i n )t h a tc o u n t r y . I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,( 6 )i n d i c a t e st h a tg i v e nt h es t r e n g t ho fp a t e n tp r o t e c t i o no f
a country (call it country ), a larger variable trade cost (smaller )o rl a r g e rﬁxed exporting
cost (larger ) induces a higher 

 and therefore a higher fraction of foreign ﬁrms doing
FDI in that country. In other words, FDI serves as a substitute for exporting as trade barriers
increase.
Substituting the above expressions for  and , (4) and (6), into the expression for
, (3), and recall that equation (2), we can re-write (see Appendix D) the expression for the












This is an interesting equation as  can be expressed in a very simple form though it has
taken into account a myriad of factors including ﬁxed costs of exporting and FDI, variable cost
of exporting, heterogeneous ﬁrms and screening of ﬁrms by the market.
We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies once-and-for-all
at time 0. These patents apply only to goods invented after time 0; goods invented beforehand
continue to receive the protections aﬀorded at their times of invention.
3T w o - c o u n t r y C a s e
Let us describe, for given patent strengths Ω and Ω, the life cycle of a typical diﬀerentiated
product developed in South. In order to prevent imitation, an innovator will apply for and
obtain a patent in each country immediately after the invention of the product. Then, she
makes a productivity draw to ﬁnd out her variable cost of production. After that, she decides
whether or not to sell overseas. During an initial phase after the product is invented, the
inventor holds an active patent in both countries. The patent holder earns an expected ﬂow of
9proﬁts of 
 from sales in the Northern market and an expected ﬂow of proﬁts of 
from sales in the Southern market. Each Northern consumer realizes a ﬂow of expected surplus
of 
 from his purchases of the good. A Southern consumer realizes an expected ﬂow of
consumer surplus of  from his purchases of the good.7
After a while, the patent will expire in one country. For concreteness, let’s say that this
happens ﬁrst in the South. We assume that local ﬁrms do not have to incur the ﬁxed cost of
market entry. (Melitz 2003, for example, makes a similar assumption.) Therefore, the good
will be legally imitated by competitive ﬁrms producing there for sales in the local (Southern)
market. The imitators will not, however, be able to sell the good legally in the North, because
t h el i v ep a t e n tt h e r ea ﬀords protection from such infringing imports. When the patent expires
in the South, the price of the good falls permanently to  =1 , and the original inventor
ceases to realize proﬁts in that market. The ﬂow of consumer surplus in the South rises to
.8
Eventually, the inventor’s patent expires in the North. Then the Northern market can be
served completely by competitive ﬁrms producing in the North. At this time, the price of
t h eg o o di nt h eN o r t hf a l l st o =1and households there begin to enjoy the higher ﬂow of
consumer surplus . The original inventor loses his remaining source of monopoly income.
Finally, after a period of length ¯  has elapsed from the moment of invention, the good becomes
obsolete and all ﬂows of consumer surplus cease.
3.1 The Best Response Functions
Consider the choice of patent policies Ω and Ω that will take eﬀect at time 0 and apply
to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for government objective function in country ,
7We do not address compulsory licensing and working requirement here as they do not seem to be of ﬁrst
order importance in the context of our analysis. Important as these issues are, we believe they should be
addressed in future research.
8Since there is no cost of patenting, a ﬁrm always patent its good in all countries once it is developed. Once
patented, the technology is disclosed. But the good cannot be legally imitated in that market until the patent
expires. So, when a patent has expired consumer surplus is  whether a good was developed overseas or locally,
as countries can always imitate foreign-developed goods when the patent has expired, and these imitated goods
are produced locally, and so there is no trade barrier when imitated goods are sold.
10discounted to time 0, is given by

















Ω +(¯  − Ω)
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= Λ0 +


























,f o r  = 
(8)
where Λ0 is the ﬁxed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in country  derive from
g o o d st h a tw e r ei n v e n t e db e f o r et i m e0 ;− or − refers to the value of variable  pertaining
to country  where  6= . The second equality arises from the fact that there is zero present-
discounted proﬁtf o re a c hﬁrm, so that
















is the value of a new patent developed in country .
We are now ready to derive the best response functions for the two governments. The best
response expresses the strength of patent protection that maximizes a national government’s
objective as a function of the given patent policy of its trading partner. We assume that country




 and therefore 
 as parametric as it chooses Ω. Consider the
choice of Ω by the government of the South. This country bears two costs from strengthening
its patent protection slightly. First, it expands the fraction of goods previously invented in
the South on which the country suﬀers a static deadweight loss of  [ −  − (1 + )].
Second, it augments the fraction of goods previo u s l yi n v e n t e di nt h eN o r t ho nw h i c hi t sc o n -
sumers realize surplus of 
 instead of . Notice that the proﬁts earned by Northern
producers in the South are not an oﬀset to this latter marginal cost, because they accrue to
patent holders in the North. The marginal beneﬁt accrued to the South from strengthening
its patent protection reﬂects the increased incentive that Northern and Southern ﬁrms have to
engage in R&D. If the objective-maximizing Ω is positive and less than ¯ , then the marginal
beneﬁt per consumer of increasing Ω must match the marginal cost, which implies
















Ω + (¯  − Ω)
¤
,( 9 )
where  is the responsiveness of innovation in each region to changes in the value of a patent





9I tc a nb ee a s i l ys h o w nt h a t = 
(1−) for all .
11It is straightforward to write down the condition for the best response of the North, analo-
gous to (9) above, so we do not put it here in the interest of space.


























¢ for  = ,( 1 0 )
where Λ = , Λ0 = ,  = Ω and  = ( + ) is the share of world
innovation that takes place in country .M o r e o v e r , = ( +) when 
−1 =1 .10 Thus,
 is unaﬀected by patent policies when 
−1 =1 .G i v e n t h a t 
−1 is suﬃciently close to one,
which has been justiﬁed by empirical research ﬁndings, we can show from (10) that the best
response functions are downward sloping, and that the best response function for the South is
everywhere steeper than that for the North, when the two are drawn in (Ω Ω) space. It
follows that the curve for the South must be steeper than that for the North at any point of
intersection. This guarantees uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and ensures stability of the
policy setting game.
3.2 International Patent Policy Coordination
In this section, we study the welfare impacts of international patent policy coordination. We
begin by characterizing the combination of patent policies that are jointly eﬃcient for the two
countries. We then compare the Nash equilibrium outcome with the eﬃcient policies, to identify
changes in the patent regime that ought to be eﬀected by an international agreement.
Eﬃcient Patent Regime
Let  = Ω +
Ω. A Southern ﬁrm that earns a ﬂow of expected proﬁts of 
for a period of length  in the South and a ﬂow of expected proﬁts of 
 for a period of
 in the North earns a total discounted sum of expected proﬁts equal to .O nt h eo t h e r
hand, a Northern innovator earns a total discounted sum of expected proﬁte q u a lt o where
 = 
Ω + Ω.
Consider the choice of patent policies Ω and Ω that will take eﬀect at time 0 and apply
to goods invented thereafter. Equation (8) becomes an expression for welfare when  =0 .
10When 
−1 =1 , 
 =1for all ,a n ds o =  for all .C o n s e q u e n t l y , = ( + ).
12Summing the expressions in (8) for  =  and  =  with  set to zero, we ﬁnd that
[(0) + (0)] = (Λ0 + Λ0)+( − )+( − )
+
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There is clearly a tradeoﬀ as patent strength is increased in either country. For example, as
Ω increases there is a direct eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e a d w e i g h tl o s sΩ ( −  − ),
which lowers global welfare. But there are indirect eﬀects that tend to increase global welfare:
an increase in Ω leads to an increase in  (), which induces faster innovation in the North
(South), thus increasing  ()a n d (). These eﬀects are globally welfare-improving.
In fact, it can be shown that when 
−1 is suﬃciently small, there exists a unique globally
optimum combination of Ω and Ω.
How do the eﬃcient combination of patent policies compare to the policies that emerge in a
noncooperative equilibrium? The answer to this question – which informs us about the likely
features of a negotiated patent agreement – is illustrated in Figure 1. The ﬁgure depicts the
best response functions and the eﬃcient policy combination on the same diagram.
Figure 1 about here
In this ﬁgure, the globally optimal policy combination is depicted by point .T h e i s o -
global-welfare lines around  are also shown. The diagram shows that simultaneous increases
of Ω and Ω from point  l e a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei ng l o b a lw e l f a r e . T h i si st r u ew h e n is
small, i.e. when government’s proﬁt-bias is weak. The reasons are clear. Starting from a
point on the South’s best response function, a marginal strengthening of IPR protection in
the South increases the world’s welfare when proﬁt-bias is weak. Such a change in Southern
policies has only a second-order eﬀect on the welfare of the South, but it conveys two positive
externalities to the North. First, it provides extra monopoly proﬁts to Northern innovators,
which contributes to the aggregate income there. Second, it enhances the incentives for R&D,
inducing an increase in both  and . The extra product diversity that results from this
additional R&D creates additional surplus for Northern consumers.
By the same token, a marginal increase in the strength of Northern patent protection from a
point along  increases world welfare. Such a change in policy enhances the proﬁti n c o m eo f
the Southern ﬁrms and encourages additional innovation in both countries. It follows that when
 is small, world welfare rises as Ω and Ω simultaneously increase from point . However, if
13 is not “small”, then it is possible that an eﬃcient patent treaty may require all countries to
reduce their strengths of patent protection. Whether or not  is small in practice is an empirical
question, which we seek to answer in the Section 5.
We deﬁne global under-protection of patent rights to be a situation when global welfare rises
as Ω and Ω are both raised from their Nash equilibrium levels. If there is under-protection of
patent rights, then starting from any interior Nash equilibrium, an eﬃcient patent treaty must
strengthen patent protection in both countries. It also implies that the treaty will strengthen
global incentives for R&D and induce faster innovation in both countries.
4M u l t i - c o u n t r y C a s e
Before bringing the model to the data, it is useful to extend the model to a multi-country
setting, as the number of independent decision-making governments plays a crucial role in
whether there is under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium. Recall that there are  countries
in the set  of country-players. Deﬁne  ≡  − ( − )Ω as the present discounted
value of consumer surplus for a consumer in country i derived from the consumption of a
home-developed diﬀerentiated good over its product life; and 0






the corresponding consumer surplus derived from the consumption of a product developed by
a foreign country.
Nash Equilibrium
















































for  =1 2 (12)
The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (12) is, in fact, the marginal cost per consumer in
country i of strengthening IPR there. The ﬁrst term is the loss in consumer surplus attributed
to protection of inventions from ﬁrms outside country i (note that while patent protection is
14in force in country i, each consumer only enjoys consumer surplus of 
 from each foreign-
developed product, but when the patent protection ceases, domestic ﬁrms can imitate the
good at no cost, and so each consumer obtains consumer surplus of  from the good); the
second term is the loss of consumer surplus attributed to protection of inventions from country
i; and the third term is the gains in proﬁts of ﬁrms in country i, which oﬀsets the losses of
consumer surplus. The right-hand side (RHS) o rt h et h i r dl i n eo f( 1 2 )i st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt
p e rc o n s u m e ri nc o u n t r yi .T h eﬁrst term is the increase in consumer welfare in country i due
to increases in ﬂows of innovations from ﬁrms outside country i; the second term is the increase
in consumer welfare in country i due to the increase in the ﬂow of innovation from country i.




Ω = −(),w h e r e () is Government i’s objective function. (Hereinafter, we
put an argument ‘’ after the name of a function if proﬁt-bias aﬀects the value of the function.)
















































for  =1 2,( 1 3 )
where  ≡ Ω and Λ ≡ . In order to solve for the values of ,f o r =1 2,w e




,w h e r e
the superscript  denotes the country with the largest market outside of the US. It turns out
that  is Japan. We shall adopt 

 =0 15 and 

 =0 03 based on the estimates of the
fractions of American ﬁrms that export and of those that carry out FDI in foreign countries,
as provided in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum
(2003). More discussion will be provided about this in the next section.
As discussed above, 
−1 should be larger than one but very close to one according to Axtell
(2001). The best response function of country  when 






(1 − Λ) − (1 + )Λ =
 (
P
 ) [1 − (1 − Λ)]
P
 
for  =1 2 (14)
Amazingly, this is mathematically equivalent to assuming that there is neither variable nor
ﬁxed trade costs. Therefore, the general case collapses to the free-trade case when 
−1 =1 .
A value closer to one entails a fatter tail of the distribution, meaning the existence of more
15giant ﬁrms. As ( − 1) tends to 1 from above, the distribution has a mean that approaches
inﬁnity, suggesting the predomination of large ﬁrms. The intuition is that when a signiﬁcant
portion of the ﬁr m se a r nv e r yh i g hp r o ﬁts, trade costs become inappreciable and hence are
no longer eﬀective in hindering trade. As the free-trade case (with  linear equations in 
unknowns  for  =1 2) is much easier to compute than the more general case (where

−1  1 and there are 4−2 equations and 4−2 unknowns), we start our analysis by assuming

−1 =1and then proceed to relax this assumption. This provides a good benchmark and a
good approximation of the more general case when 
−1 is greater than but close to one.
Global Optimum
Next, we turn to the comparison between the Nash equilibrium and the global optimum. It
can be shown that the ﬁrst-order condition for global welfare maximization with respect to the






































































The LHS of (15) (call it 15) is the marginal global cost of strengthening IPR protection
in that country. The second term inside the squared brackets () is the welfare that will
not be taken into account when IPR protection in country i is chosen to maximize the global
welfare instead of government i’s proﬁt-biased objective function (therefore it is an addition to





) reduces the global
marginal cost as it takes into account the increases in proﬁts of ﬁrms outside of country i.
The RHS (or the third line) of (15) (call it 15) represents the marginal global beneﬁto f
strengthening IPR in country i. The second term and the third term are both increases in
welfare of consumers outside of country i. The second term is due to faster foreign innovations,
while the third term is due to faster domestic innovations (“foreign” and “domestic” here are
relative to each country other than country i). The cross-border externalities of IPR protection
are captured by the third term inside the squared brackets on the LHS plus the second and
third terms on the RHS. It is apparent that since an increase in the variable trade cost (a
decrease in ) leads to less international spillovers, the likelihood of under-protection of IPR
16in equilibrium is lower. Likewise, an increase in proﬁt-bias (an increase in )r e d u c e st h eg a p
between marginal global beneﬁt and marginal national beneﬁt, making under-protection of IPR
less likely.
Let us deﬁne 15 as 
 and 15 as 






 ,w h e r e denotes the world welfare (without any bias in favor of ﬁrm proﬁts).
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Is there global under-protection of IPR?
We deﬁne under-protection as a situation when, starting from Nash equilibrium, global welfare
increases when there are positive changes in some or all of {Ω| ∈ N}(where the magnitudes
of increase need not be equal across countries). The point of the analysis is to come up with a




¯ ¯ ∈ N
ª
,s o m es i m u l t a -
neous (but not necessarily equal) increases in IPR protection of some or all countries is globally
welfare-improving. Note that an increase in the strength of protection in some or all countries
raises the values of all patents. This increases the global deadweight losses but encourages
innovation. If there is global under-protection of patent rights, then the rate of innovation in
the world is too low from a global welfare point of view. To simplify the analysis, we focus
on changes in {Ω| ∈ N} such that Ω =  for all i, where  is a constant. It is a case
where the increase in the patent protection of each country is proportional to the inverse of its
market size. Countries with smaller market size thus need to raise their patent protection by
a larger extent than countries with larger market size. In this setting, we derive a suﬃcient
condition under which such changes lead to an increase in global welfare. In other words, we
seek a condition under which the marginal global beneﬁt outweighs the marginal global cost.
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma:















This lemma provides a condition under which simultaneous strengthening of patent protec-
tion in all countries from the Nash equilibrium levels is globally welfare improving. The set of













best response function of country j is given by 1

()







means that simultaneous increases of Ω can raise global welfare .
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 for all  6= .
This clearly indicates under-protection at Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since
()
Ω =0for all






Ω =0includes the Nash equilibrium as a special case. ¥
To understand Lemma 1 better, let us consider a two-country case. First refer to Figure 1
for an idea of the relationship between Nash equilibrium and global optimum. In that diagram,
point E is the Nash equilibrium while point G is the global optimum. BRF-S and BRF-N are
the best response functions of South and North respectively. Point G is at the intersection of the
curves 
Ω =0and 
Ω =0 ,w h i c ha r en o ts h o w n . 11 It is not hard to see that starting from











 would increase .T h i si m p l i e st h a t ,
in the context of Figure 1, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for there to be under-protection
in Nash equilibrium is that point E is to the left of the curve GG.12
Figure 2 about here







Ω =0 ) . T h ec u r v e sF O C - S( d e ﬁned by 1

()




Ω =0 )a r et h eﬁrst order conditions for the maximization of global welfare with respect
to the choice of Ω and Ω respectively. In the context of Figure 2, a suﬃcient condition for
p o i n tEt ob eo nt h el e f to fG Gi st h a tE Ei st ot h el e f to fc u r v eG G .A n dt h i si se x a c t l yt h e
suﬃcient condition for under-protection (16) stated in Lemma 1. If this condition is satisﬁed, at
any point that lies on EE (including the Nash equilibrium point E), any small change in Ω and







Proposition 1 below provides a suﬃcient condition for the EE to be on the left of GG. Therefore,
our next step is to prove the following proposition:
11Note that the slopes of the iso-global-welfare lines  =  are always equal to 
 at their intersection













. But at any














12Note that if point E is to the right of GG, then any simultaneous small decrease of Ω and Ω such that
Ω
Ω = 
 would increase .
18Proposition 1 As u ﬃcient condition for under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium when





  0 (17)
where 
max is the largest 
 among all countries. This means that the positive force on the equi-
librium strengths of patent protection that arises from proﬁt-bias (measured by )i sw e a k e rt h a n
the negative force that arises from positive cross-border externalities due to the existence of a
large number of government-players (measured by
P
6=max 
), thus making the Nash equilibrium
more likely to yield under-protection.
Proof. See Appendix E. ¥
To check that  −
P
6=max 
  0 is a reasonable condition, note that in the special case
of the basic model where there are two countries ( =2 ) and there is neither trade barrier
nor proﬁt-bias (i.e. with  =1 , 
 =1for  =1 2 and  =0 ), the condition is satisﬁed.
Moreover, it accords with the intuition that the free-rider problem gets more serious when
there are more countries playing the patent-setting game, for a larger  leads to higher chance
of under-protection. It also is consistent with the notions that trade barriers weaken the cross-
border externality of IPR protection, because a smaller 
 for each  leads to lower chance
of under-protection, and that stronger government bias towards patent-holding ﬁrms tends to
strengthen patents, for a larger  leads to lower chance of under-protection. In what follow, we
shall explain a calibration exercise to ﬁnd out whether the above suﬃcient condition is satisﬁed.
We shall solve equations (13), (2), (5), (7) for  =1 2 with parametric values calibrated
using estimates in the extant literature.
The parameter  captures the degree of proﬁt-bias in governments’ objective functions. In
the political-economy literature (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Maggi and Goldberg, 1999;
Gawande et al., 2000; Mitra et al., 2002; Eicher and Osang, 2002; McCalman, 2004 and Mitra
et al., 2006), researchers have estimated the weight the U.S. government puts on campaign
contributions given a weight of unity on social welfare. The values range from 0.000315 to
1.3333. For robustness check in the calibration exercises, we set  to the extremes of parameter
estimates in the extant literature as well as to a benchmark value of 1. We tried the values of
 =0 000315 (low proﬁt-bias), 1 (strong proﬁt-bias) and 1.3333 (very strong proﬁt-bias), but
only report the case of  =1 333 in the interest of space.13
13Since  a preference parameter, it should be the same in the context of patent protection. Suppose there is
19The parameter  denotes the number of independent government decision-makers in the
patent-setting game. Thus, it is the number of countries in the world that consume and trade
patent-sensitive goods, and that adopt neither zero nor full patent protection. In Table 1, we
list the patent counts and market sizes of the twenty largest markets for patent-sensitive goods
among the forty most innovative countries.14 As the suﬃcient condition for under-protection
in the Nash equilibrium (inequality (17)) indicates, the more countries that are included in the
game, the more likely the condition is satisﬁed. Therefore, it suﬃces to prove under-protection
if we ﬁnd that the inequality holds for the twenty countries with the largest markets for patent-
sensitive goods. These countries are thus included in our empirical analysis, which gives  =2 0 .





 respectively the probabilities that foreign ﬁrms can export and carry out FDI
in country i. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) report that in 1986 only 17.4% of French
manufacturing ﬁrms exported, and of those who exported, only 19.7% exported to ten or more
countries. Moreover, in 1987, only 14.6 % of US manufacturing ﬁrms exported. Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen and Kortum (2003) report that 79% of US manufacturing plants did not export at all in
1992. A summary the existing studies in the literature indicate that 15-20% of manufacturing
ﬁrms sell to foreign markets, of which about 1/5 produce in the foreign market in which they
sell. (See, for example, Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2009). Patent-sensitive goods are likely
to be more tradeable than the average manufactured good. Therefore, to be conservative, we
assume that 15% of American ﬁrms in the patent-sensitive industries sell to foreign markets,
while 3% produce in the foreign countries in which they sell their goods. In other words, we
set 

 =0 15 and 






 for other countries are determined endogenously by equations (5) and (7)
respectively.
We estimate  based on the work of Boldrin and Levine (2009), which suggests a point
estimate of around 4.15 As we ﬁnd that our results are robust to alternative values of ,w e
just report the case of  =4in this paper.
a patent lobby, and suppose there is no consumer lobby or lobbying from other sectors of the economy, it is easy
to show that the value the government puts on campaign contributions is exactly the same as  in our model.
A proof is available from the author upon request.
14Innovative capability is measured by the number of patents granted to domestic residents of the country by
the US patent oﬃce per year over the years 1996-1999. Russia is not included due to the lack of reliable data.
See Appendix F.
15Details of the derivation can be obtained from the authors upon request.
20Lai, Wong and Yan (2007) estimate the parametric values of the elasticity of demand of
patent-sensitive goods () across thirty countries. These values average to 5.63. Given this,
we assume  =5 . This coincides with the value implied by putting together the ﬁndings of
literature that the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of ﬁrm revenues ( 
−1 in our
model) is close to 1 and the ﬁnding of Simonovska (2011) that  is approximately 4. For
robustness, we also try a low elasticity scenario with  =1 5 and a high elasticity scenario with
 =9 28. The upper value of 9.28 is obtained based on 
−1 ≈ 1 and the ﬁnding of Eaton and
Kortum (2002) that  is approximately 8.28.
As ( − 1) tends to 1 from above, the tail of the distribution gets fatter, and the dis-
tribution has a mean that approaches inﬁnity, suggesting the predomination of large ﬁrms. It
is interesting that the special case of ( − 1) → 1 converges to the free trade case in our
model, as explained earlier. The literature (e.g. Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007)) ﬁnds that
the scale parameter of the Pareto distribution is very close to one but above one. In this paper,
we report the cases of ( − 1) = 1 and ( − 1) = 1049, as these two values lie roughly at
the two ends of the spectrum of estimates obtained in the literature. Adopting this range also
ensures that there are interior solutions to all endogenous variables of interest.
For the variable trade cost, we try a wide range of values from  =0(no iceberg trade cost)
to 05 (very high iceberg trade cost). For the case ( − 1) = 1, the results are invariant to
the value of 
We proxy the market size () by the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the consump-
tion of patent-sensitive goods in each country and proxy the innovative capability ()b yt h e
number of patents granted to residents of each country by the U.S. patent oﬃce divided by the
population of the country (we adjust for home bias of American patentees).16 Data on  for
1996-1999 are obtained from Lai, Wong and Yan (2007), and data on  for 1996-1999 are from
the website of WIPO.









¯ ¯  ∈ N
ª
from equations (13), (2), (5), (7) for  =1 2 . The calibration
results are presented in Table 2. A wide range of values of proﬁt-bias have been tried ( =
0000315=1and  =1 3333) but it has relatively minor eﬀects on 
. So we only report the
results for the most conservative case of  =1 3333 in the interest of space.
16We also tried using the patent counts without dividing by population to proxy for innovative capability,
and the suﬃcient condition for under-protection (17) is still satisﬁed. But the rank order of 
 matches closer
the actual rank order of the Ginarte-Park indexes (which measure patent rights) when we use patent counts
divided by population.
21Table 2 about here
This calibration exercise yields two important results. First, we ﬁnd that the values of 

are above 0.7 for all countries under all scenarios. It follows that the suﬃcient condition for
under-protection of IPR in the Nash equilibrium speciﬁed in equation (17) is satisﬁed under
all parameter values considered. As a result, we conclude that there is under-protection
of patent rights when there is no international coordination. The major reason is the
existence of the free-rider problem in the protection of patents, which becomes very serious
when there is a large number of government-players in the patent-setting game.
Second, this sensitivity analysis allows us to assess the role played by each of the three
channels separately – namely, proﬁt-bias, ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade barriers. By varying
the parameter , we can gauge the impact of proﬁt-bias on the equilibrium patent protection
(
 ). As expected, a higher value of  is associated with a higher level of equilibrium protection.
For example, for the case 
−1 =1 ,  =1 5=0 , 
 raises from 0.341 when  =0 000315 to
0.373 when  =1 3333. For the counterpart case of 
−1 =1 049 keeping  and  unchanged,

 raises from 0.39 to 0.423. The eﬀect of proﬁt-bias is more signiﬁcant at higher values of
demand elasticity (say,  =9 28) or higher trade barrier (t=0.5).
By comparing the levels of Nash patent protection for diﬀerent values of 
−1,w en o t ea
positive association between the protection level and the shape parameter 
−1 of the ﬁrm proﬁt
distribution. For example, for the case with  =5 ,  =1 33 and  =0presented in Table
2, lowering 
−1 f r o m1 . 0 4 9t o1( m e a n i n gt h ep r e s e n c eo fm o r el a r g eﬁrms in the distribution)
leads to a reduction in 
 from 0.588 to 0.529. The most dramatic eﬀect on 
 is an increase
of 
−1 f r o m1 . 0t o1 . 0 4 9 ,l e a d i n gt oad e c r e a s eo f
 from 1 to 0.742 in Austria, the smallest
market in the sample.
In the same vein, we can explore the eﬀect of the variable trade cost by raising it from
 =0to  =0 5 while holding other parameters constant. For example, from Table 2, we ﬁnd
that a higher t leads to lower probabilities of exploiting an invention in each country (
). For
example, when  =5 , 
−1 =1 049, a=1.333, an increase of t from 0 to 0.5 leads to a decrease
in 
 from 0.915 to 0.862. However, the eﬀects of t on 
 is relatively small compared with
those of the other two channels (proﬁt-bias and ﬁrm heterogeneity).17
17As an additional robustness check, for =5, ( − 1)=1.049, t =1, we ﬁnd that the largest value of  that
would sustain the suﬃcient condition for under-protection is =13, which is a huge number and cannot possibly
be exceeded in practice. Furthermore, the largest value of  that would sustain no global over-protection of
IPR under harmonization with the maximum Nash IPR level is =8, which again is unlikely to be exceeded in
practice.
22Estimation results indicate that 

 varies across countries, but never exceed 0.2 under
various sensitivity tests, while the values of 

 for diﬀerent countries are all below 0.04. The




 for the case a=1.3333,  =9 28 ( − 1) =












US 0.150 0.030 0.851 India 0.011 0.002 0.752
Japan 0.150 0.030 0.851 S. Korea 0.049 0.010 0.808
Germany 0.097 0.019 0.834 Netherlands 0.048 0.010 0.807
France 0.073 0.015 0.823 Australia 0.007 0.001 0.735
UK 0.065 0.013 0.819 Mexico 0.015 0.003 0.763
China 0.041 0.008 0.801 Argentina 0.017 0.003 0.764
Italy 0.052 0.010 0.810 Switzerland 0.015 0.016 0.826
Brazil 0.007 0.001 0.735 Belgium 0.079 0.006 0.791
Spain 0.008 0.002 0.743 Sweden 0.031 0.012 0.815
Canada 0.066 0.013 0.819 Austria 0.008 0.002 0.742
It should be noted that if we ignored FDI / licensing, we would have severely overestimated
the barriers to exploit an invention internationally. For example, in the case of the US ﬁrms
selling to Japan, if the iceberg trade cost is t=0.5, a=1.333, 
−1 =1.049,  =9 28,a n di f
we consider the fact that 15% of US ﬁrms sell to Japan and assume that they do not do
FDI/licensing, then the estimated 
 is 0.032 [i.e. (1+05)−928+1 ·(015)
1− 1
1049]. If we take
into account the fact that 1/5 of those ﬁrms that sell to Japan (i.e. 3% of all US ﬁrms) in fact
carry out FDI/licensing, then the estimated 
 is 0.851 [i.e. (1+05)−928+1 ·(015)
1− 1
1049 +
[1 − (1 + 05)−928+1](003)
1− 1
1049]. That is a huge diﬀerence. The errors in the estimation of

 of other countries would be equally large. In fact, by omitting FDI / licensing, we would
have concluded that the suﬃcient condition for under-protection would not be satisﬁed, as the
magnitudes of the calibrated cross-border externalities would be really small. As the error
becomes more serious as 
−1 gets closer to one, the empirical fact that ﬁrm revenues follow a
fat-tailed distribution implies that it is really important to include FDI as an alternative channel
of exploitation of an invention internationally (besides exporting) in any empirical work.18
18As a ﬁnal note to this section, we recognize that some people may argue that the globally optimal combi-
nation of strengths of national patent protection should take into account the politically-augmented objective
function of each national government, as these functions reﬂect the preferences of each government, which rep-
resents each country in international negotiations. If maximizing the sum of the politically-augmented objective
functions is the goal of international coordination, then one simply need to remove the term + from the
235.2 Harmonization with the most protective country
Our analysis in the previous section indicates that under-protection of IPR will be resulted
without international coordination. A natural question to ask is whether the current form of
international coordination mandated by TRIPS is over-protective from a global welfare perspec-
tive. Adopting the views of Reichman (1995) and Lai and Qiu (2003), we assume that TRIPS
requires all countries in the world to harmonize their IPR standards with the pre-TRIPS stan-
dards of the most protective country.19 We then seek to answer the above question based on
this characterization of TRIPS.
Suppose we sum up all the J ﬁrst order conditions (15) and impose the restriction Ω = Ω∗
∀ ∈ N on this equation. The solution of Ω∗ will then yield the harmonized patent strength
that is globally eﬃcient. Suppose country k is the most protective country in equilibrium,
i.e. Ω
 =m a x {Ω

¯ ¯ ∈ N},w h e r eΩ
 is the equilibrium value of Ω. Then, Ω
  Ω∗ is
the necessary and suﬃcient condition that there is no over-protection of patent rights even if
all countries harmonize their IPR standards with the most protective country in the world.
We have already solved for Ω
 ,w h i c hi sΩ
, in the earlier section. Adopting the same set
of parametric values and employing the same set of countries as in the previous section, we
compute the values of Ω∗.T h ev a l u e so fΩ∗ under diﬀerent parameter values are provided in
t h el a s tr o w so fT a b l e2 .A st h ev a l u e so fΩ∗ are all close to 1, which exceeds the equilibrium
protection strengths of all countries including the US in all cases, we conclude that Ω
  Ω∗.
This means that there is no global over-protection of IPR resulting from TRIPS.
Therefore, we conclude that the distribution of innovative capability among countries is not
too skewed so that requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with that of the
most protective (and most innovative) country in Nash equilibrium (i.e. the US) does not lead
marginal cost of the aggregate objective function (represented by the LHS of equation (15)). In this case, it
is clear that there is always under-protection of patents in each country, as the marginal global cost is lower
than the marginal national cost while the marginal global beneﬁt is higher than the marginal national beneﬁt.
There are unambiguous positive cross-border externalities as the increases in the foreign ﬁrm proﬁts and foreign
consumer surplus due to induced innovations are not taken into account when Ω increases, just like in the basic
G-L model. The spillovers are smaller in this extended model due to the presence of trade barriers.
19If one examines the Ginarte-Park patent rights index for the periods 1960-1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 (refer
to Park 2005), one sees that the most protective country before TRIPS (i.e. 1960-1990) was the US, whose
index was 4.14. By 2005, all developed or newly industrialized economies would have already adopted the patent
standard required by TRIPS. What is the patent right index for countries that adopt the minimum requirement
mandated by TRIPS? It turned out that it is about 4.1 (e.g. Israel 4.13, Australia 4.17, New Zealand 4.01,
Norway 4.17). So harmonization with the pre-TRIPS standard of the US is more or less what the TRIPS
mandated.
24to over-protection of patent rights from the global welfare point of view.20 The situation in a
two-country case is shown in Figure 1. It shows that global harmonization with the North’s
pre-TRIPS standard is a movement from point E to point E’. As E’ is still inside the frontier
GG, global welfare increases from E to E’. The North gains more than the South loses in this
global IPR harmonization scheme, and global welfare increases. Taken together, the two results
in this section indicate that TRIPS is globally welfare-improving.
6C o n c l u s i o n
On the theoretical front, we extend the Grossman and Lai (2004) model to analyze the interac-
tion among innovation, ﬁrm heterogeneity, exporting/FDI and patenting in a uniﬁed framework.
On the empirical front, we ﬁnd that there is under-protection of global patent rights in the non-
cooperative equilibrium given the estimates of the proﬁt-bias parameter in the political economy
literature and the estimated magnitudes of trade barriers. Our conclusion to this question is
robust to alternative parameter values obtained in the literature. This is because, despite the
existence of trade barriers, the free-rider problem becomes very serious when there is a large
number of country-players in the patent-setting game. The empirical fact that ﬁrm revenues
follow a fat-tailed distribution mitigates trade and FDI barriers a great deal, sustaining a high
level of cross-border patenting externalities despite the fact that only a small fraction of ﬁrms
sell overseas (no more than say 15%) and an even small fraction of ﬁrms carry out FDI (no
more than say 3%). In our model, whether or not the patent policy harmonization scheme as
mandated by TRIPS is over-protective depends on the magnitudes of the trade barriers and
proﬁt-bias, as well as the distribution of innovative capability and the distribution of market
size among the countries in the world. Calibrating the model, we ﬁnd that requiring all coun-
tries to harmonize their patent strengths with the equilibrium strength of the most protective
country does not lead to global over-protection of IPR. This is because the distribution of in-
novative capability among countries is not too skewed as to overcome the free-rider eﬀect. If
such a scheme captures what the TRIPS has done, then there is no evidence that TRIPS leads
to global over-protection of patent rights. In other words, TRIPS is globally welfare-improving.
In our calibration exercise, we ﬁnd that omitting FDI / licensing as an alternative channel
20In a longer working paper version of this paper, we prove a proposition that implies that it is less likely for
there to be over-protection when the distribution of innovative capability among countries is not too skewed.
This makes sense as harmonization with the standard of the most innovative (and protective) country becomes
more onerous for the other countries if the most protective country is a lot more protective than the rest of the
countries.
25of exploiting an invention internationally (besides exporting) can severely over-estimate the
barriers for ﬁrms to sell overseas. Therefore, it is important to include both exporting and FDI
in any model that attempts to explain international exploitation of technology.
The theoretical framework can possibly be exploited further to analyze empirically the
relationship between innovation, trade barriers, market size, patent protection, and trade ﬂows
of patent-sensitive goods among countries. This is left to future research.
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28Appendix
AM e a n v a l u e s o f p r o ﬁt and consumer surplus
Deﬁne the unconditional means of the monopoly proﬁt, the competitive consumer surplus and
consumer surplus under monopoly, per consumer, as
 =
Z
e  () ();  =
Z
e  () ();a n d =
Z
e  () ()
where  i st h eu n i tc o s to fp r o d u c t i o n .e (), e  () and e  () are monopoly proﬁt, the com-
petitive consumer surplus and consumer surplus under monopoly, respectively, expressed as
functions of .D e ﬁne productivity  =1 . We assume that  follows a Pareto distribution.
Therefore, ()=( )
.
Recall that the demand of a typical consumer is  = − (where 1). It can be easily
shown that






−+1 where Pr( ≤ )=( )
.( 1 8 )

































−+1 where Λ ≡  (19)












B The distribution of ﬁrm proﬁts
As Axtell (Science, 2001) and other empirical work suggest, ﬁrm size follows a Pareto Distribu-
tion (),w h e r e is very close to 1. Therefore, it is natural to assume that ﬁrm productivity








 where  ∈ [∞)
which is equivalent to Pr( )=P r ( 1
  1
)=( ),w h e r e ∈ [0 1
].





Λ−+1,w eh a v e ,∀































This implies that, e  follows a Pareto Distribution (min 
−1),w h e r emin = Λ−1
−1 , represents
the minimum ﬁrm proﬁt per consumer.
According to Axtell (2001), the index 
−1 should be very close to 1. Using US Census
Bureau data on the ﬁrm size of the entire population of tax-paying ﬁrms in the US, the number
is around 1.05, and this number is also adopted by other researchers.
C Fixed cost of exporting and probability of exporting
A ﬁrm will carry out FDI in country k iﬀ
e ()Ω −  ≥ e ()Ω −  for a ﬁrm with unit cost 






Ω +  (21)
where 
 is the critical  for FDI to country .A ﬁrm will export to country k iﬀ
e ()Ω −  ≥ 0 for a ﬁrm with unit cost 








 is the critical  for exporting to country . (22)
From the last two equation, we have












Ω .( 2 3 )
We assume that

 so that the ﬁrm that carries out FDI in a country always has the
option of exporting to that country but chooses not to do so. In other words, the cutoﬀ market-
size-adjusted proﬁt for carrying out FDI is always higher than that for exporting to a country.
See Figure 3.
Figure 3 about here
We further assume that even if a good is not sold in a foreign market, the innovator still
obtains a patent there. Therefore, the good cannot be legally imitated in that market until the





































































 .( 2 5 )







 where Γ ≡
−1
 − 1


















D Value of a Patent












.T h ec u t o ﬀ cost of exporting to and doing FDI in country , 

and 
 are determined by (19), (21) and (22). After solving for 
 and 
,i ti sc l e a r

















will also do FDI in (but not export to) country ,a n dg e tap r o ﬁt e ().












1 −  + 
¶

−1,w h e r e()=( )
 ,















































T h e n ,w ec a no b t a i nt h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fap a t e n tf o raﬁrm in country  as:
























































































































































































E Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that the Nash equilibrium condition (12) is equivalent to 1

()
Ω =0while the global
optimum condition (15) is equivalent to 1


Ω =0 . W eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e di nL e m m a1t h a t















Ω =0 . From equation (15), we know this



















































The RHS of (26) is greater than zero, as there are positive cross-border externalities as a



















max is the largest 
 among all countries. This gives condition (17). ¥
32F Data for Market Size () and Innovative Capability
()
T h em a r k e ts i z ev a r i a b l e( ) is proxied by the natural logarithm of the average dollar value of
consumption (or use) of patent-sensitive goods per year by country i over the years 1996-1999
(estimated by Lai, Wong and Yan, 2007). The innovative capability variable ()i sp r o x i e d
by the average number of patents granted to the resident of country i by the US patent oﬃce
per year over the years 1996-1999 (obtained from the WIPO website) divided by population.
However, to adjust for home-bias of the US data, we calculate the US innovative capability
as the mean of an upper bound and a lower bound. The upper bound is given by the yearly




 denotes the number of patents granted to residents of country i by country j. This
is an upper bound because it probably over-states the innovative capability of the US because
even relatively trivial inventions might be patented in the US by US residents as the cost of
patenting and subsequent working of the patents by domestic residents is relatively low. This










The idea is that the American capability to obtain patents relative to that of Japan in Europe
is approximately equal to the American capability to obtain patents relative to that of Japan
in the US. Comparison with Japan is chosen because its innovative capability is comparable to
that of the US while other countries are much further behind. The reason for choosing patents
awarded in Europe is because European countries have a longer tradition of patent protection
and have patent systems similar to that of the US. Japan, on the other hand, has a more liberal
patent system with narrower protection those in the US and Europe. Therefore, calibration
with the Japanese patent counts is not done. The estimate g 
 is considered a lower bound
of US innovative capability as some useful American innovations are not patented overseas
perhaps because they are relatively less signiﬁcant (though may be still useful). This is just
the opposite of the home bias eﬀect.






After taking the above into account, we obtain Table 1, which shows the patent counts and
market sizes of the twenty most innovative countries.
33  Innovative capacity ( )  Market size (M) 
US
2  187.83 9.25 
Japan 214.25  9.07 
Germany 98.32  8.75 
France 56.76 8.57 
UK 52.08  8.45 
China 0.06  8.45 
Italy 24.24  8.43 
Brazil 0.43  8.31 
Spain 5.07  8.19 
Canada 89.80  8.17 
India 0.07  8.15 
South Korea  55.34  8.13 
Netherlands 65.15  8.02 
Australia 31.91  7.99 
Mexico 0.57 7.97 
Argentina 1.06  7.88 
Switzerland 167.53  7.85 
Belgium 57.50  7.83 
Sweden 122.82  7.77 
Austria 50.25 7.76 
Total 1281.02  164.97 
 
Table 1: Data on the Market Size of Patent-Sensitive Goods and Patent Counts 
 
Note: 
1.  M is the logarithm of the average annual consumption (or absorption) of patent-sensitive goods in the country over the years 1996-1999 
2.    is the average number of patents granted to residents of the country per year by the US Patent Office over the years 1996-1999 divided 
by population of the country. The patent count of the US is adjusted for the home-bias effect discussed in Appendix F. Trade Cost (t)=0  Trade Cost (t)=0.5 
ε =1.5    ε =5    ε =9.28    ε =1.5    ε = 5    ε =9.28   
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US  0.373  1  0.423  0.917  0.529  1  0.588  0.915  0.561  1  0.621  0.915 0.373  1  0.424  0.904  0.520  1  0.579  0.862  0.550  1  0.607  0.851 
Japan  0.367  1  0.418  0.915  0.520  1  0.597  0.915  0.550  1  0.633  0.915 0.367  1  0.419  0.903  0.529  1  0.589  0.862  0.561  1  0.620  0.851 
Germany  0.285  1  0.318  0.901  0.368  1  0.418  0.898  0.384  1  0.439  0.897 0.285  1  0.318  0.889  0.368  1  0.409  0.845  0.384  1  0.425  0.834 
France  0.246  1  0.267  0.893  0.298  1  0.331  0.887  0.307  1  0.344  0.886 0.246  1  0.266  0.881  0.298  1  0.321  0.834  0.307  1  0.331  0.823 
UK  0.231  1  0.247  0.889  0.276  1  0.303  0.882  0.285  1  0.315  0.881 0.231  1  0.246  0.877  0.276  1  0.293  0.830  0.285  1  0.302  0.819 
China  0.207  1  0.208  0.881  0.217  1  0.210  0.867  0.218  1  0.211  0.864 0.207  1  0.206  0.869  0.217  1  0.197  0.814  0.218  1  0.194  0.801 
Italy  0.215  1  0.222  0.884  0.241  1  0.251  0.874  0.245  1  0.258  0.873 0.215  1  0.221  0.872  0.241  1  0.240  0.822  0.245  1  0.243  0.810 
Brazil  0.189  1  0.181  0.875  0.196  1  0.168  0.856  0.196  1  0.035  0.790 0.189  1  0.180  0.863  0.196  1  0.154  0.804  0.196  1  0.034  0.735 
Spain  0.176  1  0.161  0.869  0.182  1  0.040  0.798  0.182  1  0.044  0.799 0.176  1  0.159  0.857  0.182  1  0.040  0.752  0.182  1  0.043  0.743 
Canada  0.214  1  0.228  0.884  0.279  1  0.308  0.881  0.291  1  0.325  0.881 0.214  1  0.228  0.872  0.279  1  0.302  0.830  0.291  1  0.316  0.819 
India  0.170  1  0.148  0.865  0.171  1  0.052  0.808  0.170  1  0.056  0.808 0.170  1  0.147  0.853  0.171  1  0.052  0.761  0.170  1  0.056  0.752 
S. Korea  0.192  1  0.193  0.877  0.232  1  0.239  0.870  0.239  1  0.250  0.870 0.192  1  0.193  0.865  0.232  1  0.232  0.819  0.239  1  0.240  0.808 
Netherlands  0.182  1  0.180  0.873  0.226  1  0.231  0.868  0.234  1  0.244  0.868 0.182  1  0.180  0.861  0.226  1  0.226  0.817  0.234  1  0.235  0.807 
Australia  0.163  1  0.142  0.863  0.182  1  0.037  0.794  0.185  1  0.038  0.793 0.163  1  0.141  0.851  0.182  1  0.035  0.746  0.185  1  0.036  0.735 
Mexico  0.145  1  0.088  0.842  0.141  1  0.078  0.823  0.139  1  0.081  0.822 0.145  1  0.084  0.829  0.141  1  0.075  0.774  0.139  1  0.076  0.763 
Argentina  0.133  1  0.064  0.829  0.127  1  0.082  0.825  0.125  1  0.084  0.823 0.133  1  0.064  0.818  0.127  1  0.078  0.775  0.125  1  0.079  0.764 
Switzerland  0.208  1  0.231  0.883  0.323  1  0.367  0.887  0.346  1  0.395  0.888 0.208  1  0.232  0.871  0.323  1  0.365  0.836  0.346  1  0.390  0.826 
Belgium  0.153  1  0.130  0.858  0.187  1  0.158  0.851  0.193  1  0.167  0.851 0.153  1  0.130  0.847  0.187  1  0.155  0.802  0.193  1  0.161  0.791 
Sweden  0.177  1  0.181  0.872  0.257  1  0.280  0.875  0.273  1  0.302  0.876 0.177  1  0.182  0.860  0.257  1  0.278  0.825  0.273  1  0.297  0.815 
Austria  0.140  1  0.094  0.844  0.166  1  0.049  0.804  0.170  1  0.048  0.801 0.140  1  0.094  0.833  0.166  1  0.045  0.754  0.170  1  0.043  0.742 
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i  denotes the patent protection of country i in Nash equilibrium. 
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EX y y , where 
i
EX   and 
i
FDI  represent the probabilities of a foreign firm selling to and carrying out 
FDI in country i respectively.  
*  denotes the globally optimal level of harmonized patent protection .  
2.    refers to the price elasticity of demand of a typical consumer. The value of  =5 is obtained from Lai, Wong and Yan (2007) and by putting together the findings of Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007) that the 
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution (
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  refers to the shape parameter of the distribution of firm revenues. Based on the data on US’s firm size distributions in 1988-1997, Axtell (2001) obtain that  
1  

 is close to and larger than 1. A recent study 
by Luttmer (2007) finds that the shape parameter is also close to but larger than 1. We perform robustness check on 
1  

 by setting its upper end to 1.049.                                                                                                      
4.  “1+a” is the weight a government puts on domestic profits when a weight of one is put on domestic consumer surplus in its objective function. The parameter “a” measures the profit-bias of governments. It ranges 
from 0.000315 to 1.3333 in the literature (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande et al., 2000; Mitra et al., 2002; Eicher and Osang, 2002; McCalman, 2004 and Mitra et al., 2005). Since a=1.3333 gives the most 
conservative case that makes us hardest to reach the under-proetction conclusion, we only present this case here. Lower values of “a” yield an even larger degree of under-protection in Nash equilibrium. E’ 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the EE curve and the GG curve. If EE is to the left of GG, 
then there is global under-protection of patent rights.  The GG, NN and SS curves are the 
same as in Figure 1. The curves are in general not straight lines.  
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Figure 3: A Foreign Firm’s Decision Concerning Exporting to and Carrying out FDI 
in Country k.    1 
Tables 2A-2F are not for publication 
Price Elasticity of Demand (ε)=1.5  and Trade Cost (t)=0 
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i   
US  0.341 1  0.390  0.158 0.032  0.918 0.365  1  0.415  0.156  0.031  0.917  0.373  1  0.423  0.155  0.031  0.917 
Japan  0.328 1  0.377  0.150 0.030  0.915 0.357  1  0.408  0.150  0.030  0.915  0.367  1  0.418  0.150  0.030  0.915 
Germany  0.274 1  0.305  0.116 0.023  0.904 0.282  1  0.315  0.110  0.022  0.902  0.285  1  0.318  0.109  0.022  0.901 
France  0.245 1  0.265  0.098 0.020  0.897 0.246  1  0.267  0.090  0.018  0.894  0.246  1  0.267  0.088  0.018  0.893 
UK  0.231 1  0.246  0.089 0.018  0.893 0.231  1  0.247  0.082  0.016  0.890  0.231  1  0.247  0.080  0.016  0.889 
China  0.221 1  0.225  0.081 0.016  0.889 0.211  1  0.213  0.070  0.014  0.883  0.207  1  0.208  0.067  0.013  0.881 
Italy  0.223 1  0.231  0.083 0.017  0.890 0.217  1  0.225  0.074  0.015  0.886  0.215  1  0.222  0.072  0.014  0.884 
Brazil  0.203 1  0.200  0.070 0.014  0.883 0.193  1  0.186  0.060  0.012  0.877  0.189  1  0.181  0.057  0.011  0.875 
Spain  0.189 1  0.179  0.062 0.012  0.878 0.180  1  0.166  0.052  0.010  0.871  0.176  1  0.161  0.049  0.010  0.869 
Canada  0.204 1  0.215  0.074 0.015  0.886 0.211  1  0.225  0.072  0.014  0.884  0.214  1  0.228  0.071  0.014  0.884 
India  0.184 1  0.170  0.058 0.012  0.876 0.173  1  0.154  0.048  0.010  0.868  0.170  1  0.148  0.045  0.009  0.865 
South Korea  0.191 1  0.192  0.066 0.013  0.881 0.192  1  0.193  0.061  0.012  0.878  0.192  1  0.193  0.060  0.012  0.877 
Netherlands  0.179 1  0.174  0.059 0.012  0.876 0.181  1  0.179  0.056  0.011  0.874  0.182  1  0.180  0.055  0.011  0.873 
Australia  0.169 1  0.150  0.050 0.010  0.869 0.164  1  0.144  0.044  0.009  0.864  0.163  1  0.142  0.042  0.008  0.863 
Mexico  0.159 1  0.124  0.041 0.008  0.861 0.148  1  0.100  0.030  0.006  0.849  0.145  1  0.088  0.025  0.005  0.842 
Argentina  0.148 1  0.094  0.030 0.006  0.849 0.137  1  0.064  0.019  0.004  0.830  0.133  1  0.064  0.018  0.004  0.829 
Switzerland  0.177 1  0.189  0.062 0.012  0.879 0.200  1  0.221  0.068  0.014  0.882  0.208  1  0.231  0.069  0.014  0.883 
Belgium  0.152 1  0.126  0.041 0.008  0.861 0.153  1  0.129  0.038  0.008  0.859  0.153  1  0.130  0.038  0.008  0.858 
Sweden  0.157 1  0.151  0.049 0.010  0.868 0.172  1  0.174  0.052  0.010  0.871  0.177  1  0.181  0.053  0.011  0.872 
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Table 2A: Nash Equilibrium and Harmonized Global Optimum  




i   denotes the patent protection of country i under non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  
i
EX   and 
i
FDI   represent the probabilities of a 
foreign firm selling to and carrying out FDI in country i respectively. 
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EX y y . 
*   denotes the 
globally optimal level of harmonized patent protection .    2 
2.  ε refers to the price elasticity of demand of a typical consumer. The value of ε=5 is obtained from Lai, Wong and Yan (2007) and by 
putting together the findings of Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007) that the scale parameter of the Pareto distribution (
1  
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) is close to but 










  refers to the shape parameter of the distribution of firm revenues. Based on the data on US’s firm size distributions in 1988-1997, 
Axtell (2001) obtain that  
1  

 is close to but larger than 1. A recent study by Luttmer (2007) finds that the shape parameter is also close 
to but larger than 1. We perform robustness check on 
1  

 by setting its upper end to 1.049. 
4.  “1+a” is the weight a government puts on domestic profits when a weight of one is put on domestic consumer surplus in its objective 
function. The parameter “a” measures the profit-bias of governments. It ranges from 0.000315 to 1.3333 in the literature (Goldberg and 




















   3 
 
Price Elasticity of Demand (ε)=5  and Trade Cost (t)=0 
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US  0.440 1  0.504  0.156 0.031  0.917 0.504  1  0.564  0.152  0.030  0.916  0.529  1  0.588  0.151  0.030  0.915 
Japan  0.430 1  0.496  0.150 0.030  0.915 0.500  1  0.568  0.150  0.030  0.915  0.520  1  0.597  0.150  0.030  0.915 
Germany  0.339 1  0.380  0.109 0.022  0.902 0.361  1  0.404  0.101  0.020  0.898  0.368  1  0.418  0.099  0.020  0.898 
France  0.295 1  0.319  0.089 0.018  0.893 0.297  1  0.323  0.078  0.016  0.888  0.298  1  0.331  0.076  0.015  0.887 
UK  0.277 1  0.294  0.081 0.016  0.889 0.277  1  0.295  0.070  0.014  0.883  0.276  1  0.303  0.068  0.014  0.882 
China  0.252 1  0.249  0.068 0.014  0.882 0.226  1  0.214  0.050  0.010  0.869  0.217  1  0.210  0.047  0.009  0.867 
Italy  0.260 1  0.266  0.072 0.014  0.884 0.246  1  0.249  0.058  0.012  0.876  0.241  1  0.251  0.056  0.011  0.874 
Brazil  0.231 1  0.215  0.057 0.011  0.875 0.205  1  0.173  0.039  0.008  0.860  0.196  1  0.168  0.036  0.007  0.856 
Spain  0.215 1  0.188  0.049 0.010  0.868 0.191  1  0.138  0.030  0.006  0.850  0.182  1  0.040  0.008  0.002  0.798 
Canada  0.254 1  0.268  0.071 0.014  0.884 0.272  1  0.293  0.067  0.013  0.881  0.279  1  0.308  0.067  0.013  0.881 
India  0.208 1  0.171  0.044 0.009  0.864 0.181  1  0.053  0.011  0.002  0.810  0.171  1  0.052  0.010  0.002  0.808 
South Korea  0.230 1  0.226  0.059 0.012  0.876 0.231  1  0.230  0.052  0.010  0.871  0.232  1  0.239  0.051  0.010  0.870 
Netherlands  0.218 1  0.208  0.053 0.011  0.872 0.224  1  0.219  0.049  0.010  0.868  0.226  1  0.231  0.049  0.010  0.868 
Australia  0.197 1  0.159  0.040 0.008  0.860 0.186  1  0.132  0.028  0.006  0.847  0.182  1  0.037  0.007  0.001  0.794 
Mexico  0.178 1  0.076  0.018 0.004  0.829 0.150  1  0.081  0.017  0.003  0.827  0.141  1  0.078  0.016  0.003  0.823 
Argentina  0.164 1  0.085  0.020 0.004  0.834 0.136  1  0.084  0.017  0.003  0.827  0.127  1  0.082  0.016  0.003  0.825 
Switzerland  0.242 1  0.266  0.067 0.013  0.881 0.302  1  0.338  0.075  0.015  0.886  0.323  1  0.367  0.077  0.015  0.887 
Belgium  0.184 1  0.136  0.033 0.007  0.853 0.186  1  0.142  0.030  0.006  0.849  0.187  1  0.158  0.032  0.006  0.851 
Sweden  0.207 1  0.204  0.050 0.010  0.870 0.244  1  0.257  0.055  0.011  0.874  0.257  1  0.280  0.058  0.012  0.875 
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Table 2B: Nash Equilibrium and Harmonized Global Optimum  
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Price Elasticity of Demand (ε)=9.28  and Trade Cost (t)=0 
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US  0.458 1  0.517  0.155 0.031  0.917 0.533  1  0.597  0.151 0.030 0.916  0.561  1  0.621  0.150  0.030  0.915 
Japan  0.450 1  0.524  0.150 0.030  0.915 0.526  1  0.604  0.150 0.030 0.915  0.550  1  0.633  0.150  0.030  0.915 
Germany  0.351 1  0.393  0.108 0.022  0.901 0.375  1  0.427  0.100 0.020 0.898  0.384  1  0.439  0.098  0.020  0.897 
France  0.304 1  0.328  0.088 0.018  0.892 0.306  1  0.340  0.077 0.015 0.887  0.307  1  0.344  0.075  0.015  0.886 
UK  0.286 1  0.302  0.079 0.016  0.888 0.285  1  0.311  0.069 0.014 0.883  0.285  1  0.315  0.067  0.013  0.881 
China  0.258 1  0.251  0.065 0.013  0.880 0.228  1  0.221  0.049 0.010 0.868  0.218  1  0.211  0.044  0.009  0.864 
Italy  0.267 1  0.270  0.070 0.014  0.883 0.251  1  0.260  0.057 0.011 0.875  0.245  1  0.258  0.054  0.011  0.873 
Brazil  0.236 1  0.215  0.055 0.011  0.873 0.206  1  0.179  0.038 0.008 0.859  0.196  1  0.035  0.006  0.001  0.790 
Spain  0.219 1  0.186  0.046 0.009  0.866 0.192  1  0.042  0.008 0.002 0.799  0.182  1  0.044  0.008  0.002  0.799 
Canada  0.263 1  0.277  0.070 0.014  0.883 0.284  1  0.313  0.067 0.013 0.882  0.291  1  0.325  0.067  0.013  0.881 
India  0.211 1  0.167  0.041 0.008  0.861 0.181  1  0.053  0.010 0.002 0.808  0.170  1  0.056  0.011  0.002  0.808 
South Korea  0.237 1  0.231  0.057 0.011  0.875 0.239  1  0.245  0.052 0.010 0.871  0.239  1  0.250  0.051  0.010  0.870 
Netherlands  0.225 1  0.213  0.052 0.010  0.871 0.232  1  0.236  0.049 0.010 0.869  0.234  1  0.244  0.048  0.010  0.868 
Australia  0.202 1  0.156  0.037 0.007  0.858 0.189  1  0.040  0.008 0.002 0.796  0.185  1  0.038  0.007  0.001  0.793 
Mexico  0.181 1  0.082  0.019 0.004  0.831 0.150  1  0.082  0.016 0.003 0.825  0.139  1  0.081  0.015  0.003  0.822 
Argentina  0.166 1  0.088  0.020 0.004  0.834 0.135  1  0.086  0.017 0.003 0.826  0.125  1  0.084  0.016  0.003  0.823 
Switzerland  0.255 1  0.279  0.067 0.013  0.882 0.323  1  0.367  0.076 0.015 0.887  0.346  1  0.395  0.079  0.016  0.888 
Belgium  0.190 1  0.133  0.031 0.006  0.850 0.192  1  0.159  0.032 0.006 0.851  0.193  1  0.167  0.032  0.006  0.851 
Sweden  0.216 1  0.213  0.050 0.010  0.870 0.258  1  0.280  0.057 0.011 0.875  0.273  1  0.302  0.059  0.012  0.876 
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Table 2C: Nash Equilibrium and Harmonized Global Optimum  








Price Elasticity of Demand (ε)=1.5  and Trade Cost (t)=0.5 
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US  0.341 1  0.390  0.158 0.032 0.905 0.365 1  0.415 0.156  0.031 0.905 0.373 1  0.424 0.155 0.031  0.904 
Japan  0.328 1  0.378  0.150 0.030 0.903 0.357 1  0.408 0.150  0.030 0.903 0.367 1  0.419 0.150 0.030  0.903 
Germany  0.274 1  0.304  0.115 0.023 0.892 0.282 1  0.315 0.110  0.022 0.890 0.285 1  0.318 0.108 0.022  0.889 
France  0.245 1  0.264  0.097 0.019 0.885 0.246 1  0.266 0.090  0.018 0.882 0.246 1  0.266 0.088 0.018  0.881 
UK  0.231 1  0.245  0.088 0.018 0.881 0.231 1  0.246 0.082  0.016 0.878 0.231 1  0.246 0.080 0.016  0.877 
China  0.221 1  0.223  0.080 0.016 0.877 0.211 1  0.211 0.070  0.014 0.871 0.207 1  0.206 0.066 0.013  0.869 
Italy  0.223 1  0.230  0.082 0.016 0.878 0.217 1  0.223 0.074  0.015 0.874 0.215 1  0.221 0.071 0.014  0.872 
Brazil  0.203 1  0.198  0.069 0.014 0.871 0.193 1  0.185 0.059  0.012 0.865 0.189 1  0.180 0.056 0.011  0.863 
Spain  0.189 1  0.177  0.061 0.012 0.866 0.180 1  0.164 0.052  0.010 0.859 0.176 1  0.159 0.049 0.010  0.857 
Canada  0.204 1  0.215  0.074 0.015 0.874 0.211 1  0.225 0.072  0.014 0.873 0.214 1  0.228 0.071 0.014  0.872 
India  0.184 1  0.168  0.057 0.011 0.863 0.173 1  0.152 0.048  0.010 0.856 0.170 1  0.147 0.045 0.009  0.853 
South Korea  0.191 1  0.191  0.065 0.013 0.869 0.192 1  0.192 0.061  0.012 0.866 0.192 1  0.193 0.059 0.012  0.865 
Netherlands  0.179 1  0.174  0.058 0.012 0.864 0.181 1  0.179 0.055  0.011 0.862 0.182 1  0.180 0.054 0.011  0.861 
Australia  0.169 1  0.149  0.050 0.010 0.858 0.164 1  0.143 0.044  0.009 0.853 0.163 1  0.141 0.042 0.008  0.851 
Mexico  0.159 1  0.122  0.040 0.008 0.849 0.148 1  0.098 0.029  0.006 0.837 0.145 1  0.084 0.024 0.005  0.829 
Argentina  0.148 1  0.091  0.029 0.006 0.836 0.137 1  0.064 0.019  0.004 0.819 0.133 1  0.064 0.018 0.004  0.818 
Switzerland  0.177 1  0.191  0.063 0.013 0.867 0.200 1  0.222 0.068  0.014 0.870 0.208 1  0.232 0.069 0.014  0.871 
Belgium  0.152 1  0.126  0.041 0.008 0.850 0.153 1  0.129 0.038  0.008 0.847 0.153 1  0.130 0.038 0.008  0.847 
Sweden  0.157 1  0.152  0.049 0.010 0.857 0.172 1  0.175 0.052  0.010 0.860 0.177 1  0.182 0.053 0.011  0.860 
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Table 2D: Nash Equilibrium and Harmonized Global Optimum  
When Price Elasticity of Demand ε=1.5 and Trade Cost t=0.5 (High Trade Cost Scenario)  
 
 





Price Elasticity of Demand (ε)=5  and Trade Cost (t)=0.5 
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US  0.440 1  0.500  0.155 0.031  0.863 0.500  1  0.557  0.151  0.030  0.862  0.520  1  0.579  0.150  0.030  0.862 
Japan  0.430 1  0.494  0.150 0.030  0.862 0.504  1  0.563  0.150  0.030  0.862  0.529  1  0.589  0.150  0.030  0.862 
Germany  0.339 1  0.373  0.108 0.022  0.849 0.361  1  0.396  0.100  0.020  0.846  0.368  1  0.409  0.098  0.020  0.845 
France  0.295 1  0.310  0.087 0.017  0.840 0.297  1  0.314  0.077  0.015  0.835  0.298  1  0.321  0.075  0.015  0.834 
UK  0.277 1  0.286  0.078 0.016  0.836 0.277  1  0.287  0.069  0.014  0.831  0.276  1  0.293  0.067  0.013  0.830 
China  0.252 1  0.236  0.064 0.013  0.828 0.226  1  0.202  0.047  0.009  0.817  0.217  1  0.197  0.044  0.009  0.814 
Italy  0.260 1  0.255  0.069 0.014  0.832 0.246  1  0.239  0.057  0.011  0.824  0.241  1  0.240  0.054  0.011  0.822 
Brazil  0.231 1  0.202  0.054 0.011  0.822 0.205  1  0.161  0.037  0.007  0.807  0.196  1  0.154  0.034  0.007  0.804 
Spain  0.215 1  0.175  0.045 0.009  0.815 0.191  1  0.122  0.027  0.005  0.796  0.182  1  0.040  0.008  0.002  0.752 
Canada  0.254 1  0.264  0.070 0.014  0.832 0.272  1  0.288  0.067  0.013  0.830  0.279  1  0.302  0.067  0.013  0.830 
India  0.208 1  0.158  0.040 0.008  0.811 0.181  1  0.053  0.011  0.002  0.764  0.171  1  0.052  0.011  0.002  0.761 
South Korea  0.230 1  0.220  0.057 0.011  0.824 0.231  1  0.224  0.051  0.010  0.820  0.232  1  0.232  0.050  0.010  0.819 
Netherlands  0.218 1  0.204  0.052 0.010  0.821 0.224  1  0.215  0.048  0.010  0.817  0.226  1  0.226  0.048  0.010  0.817 
Australia  0.197 1  0.151  0.038 0.008  0.808 0.186  1  0.125  0.027  0.005  0.796  0.182  1  0.035  0.007  0.001  0.746 
Mexico  0.178 1  0.075  0.018 0.004  0.781 0.150  1  0.078  0.016  0.003  0.777  0.141  1  0.075  0.015  0.003  0.774 
Argentina  0.164 1  0.081  0.019 0.004  0.783 0.136  1  0.080  0.017  0.003  0.778  0.127  1  0.078  0.016  0.003  0.775 
Switzerland  0.242 1  0.270  0.068 0.014  0.831 0.302  1  0.338  0.075  0.015  0.835  0.323  1  0.365  0.078  0.016  0.836 
Belgium  0.184 1  0.135  0.033 0.007  0.803 0.186  1  0.141  0.030  0.006  0.800  0.187  1  0.155  0.032  0.006  0.802 
Sweden  0.207 1  0.208  0.051 0.010  0.820 0.244  1  0.256  0.056  0.011  0.823  0.257  1  0.278  0.058  0.012  0.825 
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Table 2E: Nash Equilibrium and Harmonized Global Optimum  
When Price Elasticity of Demand ε=5 and Trade Cost t=0.5 (High Trade Cost Scenario)  
 






Price Elasticity of Demand (ε)=9.28  and Trade Cost (t)=0.5 
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US  0.458 1  0.518  0.154 0.031  0.852 0.526  1  0.585  0.151  0.030  0.851  0.550  1  0.607  0.150  0.030  0.851 
Japan  0.450 1  0.514  0.150 0.030  0.851 0.533  1  0.594  0.150  0.030  0.851  0.561  1  0.620  0.150  0.030  0.851 
Germany  0.351 1  0.383  0.106 0.021  0.838 0.375  1  0.415  0.099  0.020  0.835  0.384  1  0.425  0.097  0.019  0.834 
France  0.304 1  0.316  0.085 0.017  0.829 0.306  1  0.327  0.076  0.015  0.824  0.307  1  0.331  0.073  0.015  0.823 
UK  0.286 1  0.290  0.077 0.015  0.825 0.285  1  0.299  0.068  0.014  0.820  0.285  1  0.302  0.065  0.013  0.819 
China  0.258 1  0.234  0.061 0.012  0.816 0.228  1  0.205  0.046  0.009  0.805  0.218  1  0.194  0.041  0.008  0.801 
Italy  0.267 1  0.256  0.067 0.013  0.820 0.251  1  0.246  0.055  0.011  0.812  0.245  1  0.243  0.052  0.010  0.810 
Brazil  0.236 1  0.199  0.051 0.010  0.809 0.206  1  0.162  0.035  0.007  0.795  0.196  1  0.034  0.007  0.001  0.735 
Spain  0.219 1  0.170  0.042 0.008  0.802 0.192  1  0.041  0.008  0.002  0.743  0.182  1  0.043  0.008  0.002  0.743 
Canada  0.263 1  0.272  0.069 0.014  0.821 0.284  1  0.305  0.067  0.013  0.820  0.291  1  0.316  0.066  0.013  0.819 
India  0.211 1  0.149  0.037 0.007  0.797 0.181  1  0.053  0.011  0.002  0.752  0.170  1  0.056  0.011  0.002  0.752 
South Korea  0.237 1  0.223  0.056 0.011  0.813 0.239  1  0.236  0.051  0.010  0.809  0.239  1  0.240  0.049  0.010  0.808 
Netherlands  0.225 1  0.208  0.051 0.010  0.809 0.232  1  0.228  0.048  0.010  0.807  0.234  1  0.235  0.048  0.010  0.807 
Australia  0.202 1  0.147  0.035 0.007  0.796 0.189  1  0.037  0.007  0.001  0.738  0.185  1  0.036  0.007  0.001  0.735 
Mexico  0.181 1  0.079  0.018 0.004  0.772 0.150  1  0.078  0.016  0.003  0.766  0.139  1  0.076  0.015  0.003  0.763 
Argentina  0.166 1  0.083  0.019 0.004  0.773 0.135  1  0.081  0.016  0.003  0.767  0.125  1  0.079  0.015  0.003  0.764 
Switzerland  0.255 1  0.284  0.069 0.014  0.821 0.323  1  0.364  0.077  0.015  0.825  0.346  1  0.390  0.079  0.016  0.826 
Belgium  0.190 1  0.133  0.031 0.006  0.791 0.192  1  0.154  0.031  0.006  0.791  0.193  1  0.161  0.031  0.006  0.791 
Sweden  0.216 1  0.217  0.052 0.010  0.810 0.258  1  0.278  0.057  0.011  0.814  0.273  1  0.297  0.059  0.012  0.815 
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Table 2F: Nash Equilibrium and Harmonized Global Optimum  
When Price Elasticity of Demand ε=9.28 and Trade Cost t=0.5 (High Trade Cost Scenario)  
 